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Abstract: The Bali bombing around two decades ago has caused
deep traumatic events in the world, not only psychological, socioeconomic,
and multinational effects, but also serious impacts on the relationship
between the two religions: Islam and Hindusm. This study documents
how Muslims as a minority group in Bali attempted to survive amidst
the Hindu majority and how these two ethnic-religious groups maintain
harmonious relationship after the Bali Bombing incident. This study
uses a case study methods with an interpretive paradigm and qualitative
approach, the aim is to shows that social pressure and discrimination
has not harm the relationship between the two in that the Muslim
and Hindus cooperate in the economic sector and strengthen the
relationship with kinship and marriage. This effort is a way for the
Muslim-Hindus to rebuild the moderation of unity which was collapsed
in Bali.
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Introduction
Bali is a province in Indonesia which is known as the
most beautiful tourist destination where tourists from all over
the world come to Bali.1 In contrast, Bali is also known as the
most tragic city because it was the target of the execution of
terrorist bombings2 on 12 October 2002 and 1 October 2005.
Two incidents that night witnessed how cruel the radical extremist
action was to destroy Bali. The multi-layered psychological effects
are felt by the directly affected victims or family members of
the world disaster incident. It takes a very long time for psychological
recovery and coping with the traumatic incident.3
Bali is a province in Indonesia which 83.46% of the majority
were Hindus, and the other 13.37% were Muslims.4 Even it is
regarded as the city of “Hindu Bali.”5 As result, the bloody
incident affected the face of Islam negatively by a series of
“slander” saying that Islam tought violence and created a dilemma
of public perceptions of its adherents.6
Reuter (2008) in his research found that the process of
religious revitalization after the Bali Bombings in 2002 and
2005 had a critical relationship between Muslims and Hindus.7
The heartbreaking incident 18 years ago still leaves deep wounds
for the international community, and also harms Muslim-Hindu
relationships in Bali. In the Hutchison study (2010)8, after the
Bali bombing, the trauma affected the political, trading, and
economical stability of international relations. Likewise, the
tourism sector was collapse which indirectly had a significant
impact on socio-economic decline,9 and above all, the tension
between Muslim-Hindu relations in Bali; because adherents of
the Islamic religion were generalized as terrorists and radicals.10
Based on the data from the ISIM Newsletter from Leiden
University, he explained that the tension in Muslim-Hindu
relations in Bali had indeed been going on since 1958, but a
climax emerged after the Bali Bombings.11After that, Muslims
in Bali became the target of government intervention and investigations
so that Muslims at that time experienced “social isolation”. Up
to these days, Hindus as the majority of the population of Bali
are still wary of and Muslims as adherents of a religion that is
terrorism; this is what makes the resilience and sustainability
of Muslims in Bali suppressed in carrying out socio-religious
and economic activities.12
This article aims to further discuss the resilience of Muslims
and their relationship with the Hindus amidst pressure as a
minority in Bali in the context of religious moderation. The
case study was conducted in Denpasar, the capital city of Bali,
which is said to be an area that has a high religious level. In this
paper, Muslim resilience is contextualized as an individual’s
ability to adapt to the surrounding environment and survive
being suppressed minorities after the Bali bombing tragedy.
Resilience can also be said as managing emotions and regulating
emotions to remain calm under pressure, being a minority in
a majority group, different from other individuals, and so on.13
Metholology
Even though the setting is full of issues of religious ethnic
conflict, Bali as the object of strong Hindu nationalism and
increasing Islamic militancy (shown by terrorism), this setting
arises from divisions and builds relationships between ethnic
religions that were initially at odds, which led to studies such as
this still very unique.
Some of the questions answered in this study; First, how is
the resilience of Muslim families in Denpasar Bali in socializing
and their relations with Hindus which is the majority group in
Denpasar Bali. Second, how the resilience of Balinese Muslims
in the economic sector where they are a minority but dominate.
Third, what is the context of the kinship and marriage relations
carried out by the two adherents of this religion. Most of the
research had been conducted non-specifically and focused on
the general social context of resilience, and ignored the context
of Muslim minorities like in Bali. Therefore, this study contributes
to the discussion about the resilience of Balinese Muslim minorities
in the majority of the Hindus, and their relationship with
Hindus after the Bali Bombing tragedy. Data collection was
carried out at the end of February 2020 to the end of March
2020 by interviewing 10 random informants (4 from Muslim,
6 from Hinduism). Data analysis used mapping intending to
map the symptoms of casuistic phenomena the resilience of
the Muslim minority in Bali can survive and live side by side
with the Hindus in the social suppression of the Hindus majority
after the Bali Bombing tragedy.
Results and Discussion
The Impact of the Post-Bali Bombing and the Fate of Minority
Muslims in Denpasar Bali
Bali is known as a “paradise” for tourism, culture, and
beautiful natural resources. However, it turned into a “hell” city
because of the Bali Bombing incident in 2002 and 2005. This
terminology is used to describe Bali after the bombing terror,
as Suryani (2009) calls it “suicide in Heaven,”14 Lewis (2006)
calls Bali a “polluted paradise”, while McDonald (2017) considers
that the world still questions the status of security in Bali after
the bombing incident.15
This perception also makes foreign tourists feeling “insecure”
about the current condition of Bali and try to restore the good
name of Bali as a tourism destination as it was in the past16
because after all the incidents left deep wounds and trauma
which caused the image of Bali to be a tourism crisis since a
great number of foreign tourists were reluctant to visit Bali
anymore, thus the Indonesian government executed investigation
toward this crisis after disaster recovery.17
Besides the impact of psychological trauma, the bloody
incident had an impact on Indonesia’s national security in
particular18 and economic, social, and politicalstability in Asia
and the European Union.19 Lewis’s study above voices the aspirations
of the local Balinese people to the government to restore the
image of Bali as a tourism island by considering the recontextualization
of policies and agendas that are in line with Bali’s current
conditions.20
The immediate effect on Balinese society is the long-term
impact on health and well-being after the Bali Bombing21, and
negative stigma against Muslims in Bali. However, the extreme
long-term impact is the stigmatization of Islam after the Bali
Bombing, considering that religion is the main link in acts of
terrorism.22 The invitation to “jihad” in the paradise land of
Bali had become the main persuasion of how religion is a
vessel to legitimize the false truth behind the tendencies of
certain group interests.23
Especially Islam as a minority religion in Bali can cause
social-psychological effects where its adherents must survive in
the discrimination of the majority of the Hindus. Harmony
and discrimination are two contrasting things that must be
experienced by Muslims as a minor population and Hindus as
a major population, even among fellow Muslims this reality
occurs.24 In this aspect, religious identity is the main issue in
life together.25
Socially, Muslims as religious minorities were facing discrimination
after the Bali Bombing incident. Islam is considered the most
responsible for this bloody act of why there is radicalism in its
teachings, even though this assumption is not completely accepted
because in fact Islam does not teach nuances of violence; only
certain groups consider radicalism as a way to scorch something
contrary with religion. Any religion does not teach terrorism at
all as part of the climax form of crimes against humanity.26 Of
course; this is a trigger for social conflict massively affecting
the existence of Muslims in Bali. The pressures in living side
by side with Hindus became more intense after the bloody
incidents of 2002 and 2005.
Minority Muslims and Discrimination in Denpasar, Bali
A total of 13.37% of the Muslim population inhabiting
the province of Bali are spread across various districts and form
Muslim villages, one of which is the Kampung Bugis, a Muslim
community village located in Serangan village and Kepaon
village, Denpasar.27
By the seventeenth century, the Bugis Muslim community
expanded to Bali via sea routes led by the Bugis ‘ulamâ’, namely
Syekh Haji Mukmin or known by the Bugis community as
Puwak Matoa. This Bugis Muslim Diaspora occurred because
they did not want to be colonized by the Dutch. A group of
Muslim Bugis people who made the voyage arrived in the area
of Serangan Island, which at that time was under the control of
King Cokorda Pemecutan III of the Badung Kingdom.28 Islam
was accepted in the village of Serangan Denpasar by King Cokorda
Pemecutan III because of the hospitality of the Bugis Muslims
and their help when the Badung Kingdom was attacked by its
enemies. Because of the goodness of the Bugis Muslims, until
King Cokorda Pemecutan III gave away 2.5 hectares of land for
the residence of the Bugis Muslim community. Not only that,
whenever Bugis Muslims came to Puri Pemecutan, they face
the King not like ordinary people, but instead face the King
like a best friend.29
The relationship between Bugis Muslims and Hindus at
the Denpasar Bali attack were well-established, until the Bali
Bombing I on October 12, 2002, and the Bali Bombing II on
October 1, 2005 happened, which raisedHindus’ distrust of
Muslims and eventually sparked religious racist sentiments towards
all Muslims in Bali and other Islamic symbols.
This sentiment created discrimination in the form of Hindus
pressure on every Muslim and Islamic symbols, such as prohibiting
Muslim women from wearing face coverings for Muslim women
(such as the Hijab, Hijab, and Niqâb) in government institutions
and shopping centers, the expulsion of bearded Muslims and
their wives from wearing Niqâb, prohibiting permits to build
mosques or prayer rooms, Islamic educational institutions such
as Madrasah Ibtidaiyah, Islamic Kindergartens (TK Islam), and
to use speakers in  for the call to prayer, and Muslim burial
sites.
This pressure did not only affect religious identity but also
economic areas, such as the prohibition of selling Bakso (meatballs)
and other halal food for street vendors and Muslim culinary
businesses. Hindus werereluctant to buy products and food sold
by Muslims as a discriminatory reaction to the primitive beliefs
of their religion. Due to this action, Muslims sellers had to
survive and even “went bankrupt” and some returned to their
respective areas.30 Muslims must “rack their brains” to switch
to other endeavors to survive in Bali, such as Balinese souvenirs,
furniture, and online drivers (such as Grab, Gojek, and Uber).
After the Bali Bombings I and II, the atmosphere of sentiment
towards Muslims was very pronounced. Hindus and foreign
tourists considered that Islamic identity is always associated
with the Hijab, Hijab, and Niqâb. Thus whenever a Muslimah
who wore  this attribute was  seen as part of and who supports
terrorists, especially when the Muslim’s soul is seen wearing
“celana cingkrang” and a beard, they were  labeled as  terrorists,
and  that the person concerned was  expelled from his village.
For example, in Buleleng, a man and his family were welcome
to leave Bali.31 Hijab,  and Niqâb are the most powerful symbols
in visualizing Islam which is known globally as a stereotypical
marker of radicalism.32 In Bali, the wearing of these three clothes
is considered a symbol of religious extremism in socializing.
Discrimination against Muslimah also occurred  in several
malls such as Ramayana Mall Denpasar and Level 21 Mall which
prohibit Mall employees from wearing headscarves and hijabs.
This decision was based on the principle of a sense of comfort
and serenity for visitors to the Mall after the Bali Bombing.33
The two cases were  the most striking because the attribute of
religion is considered a representation of a religious belief, as
revealed by Shirazi and Mishra (2010).34 As immigrants who
have also settled in Bali, Muslims must comply with the ethics
set by traditional leaders and local governments in Bali. Several
informants we interviewed said that since then many Muslims
did not maintain beards and have minimized all forms of striking
religious attributes as an effort to resilience social life with
residents.
Repressive actions against minority Muslims in Denpasar
are also felt in Islamic educational institutions such as Madrasah
Ibtidaiyah, Islamic Kindergarten (TK Islam). After the Bali
Bombing, these two types of institutions were prohibited from
being established and even threatened to be closed, because the
situation in Bali which was not conducive to Islamic education
institutions was seen as a place to “poison” children’s minds to
take radical actions,  although some authorities have temporarily
closed Islamic education institutions as a preventive measure
to counter the beliefs that could damage Bali’s image as an
“Pulau Dewata” (Island of the Gods).35 As a resilience effort,
several Islamic schools have to negotiate with local leaders and
the surrounding environment about what is taught in schools
such as Madrasah Ibtidaiyah, Kindergarten (TK Islam). Several
teachers in schools revealed how they had to survive in the
onslaught of discrimination and negative stigma against Islam
that had an impact on Islamic educational institutions.36
As a consequence of that, the people of Hindus prohibited
permitting burial sites for Muslims. This discrimination is
based on the sentiment of rejecting Balinese people in general
and Hindus in particular because Islam is considered to be the
“destroyer of the Bali Earth”, it is not appropriate for them to
be buried on Bumi Bali which strongly condemns this cursed
act.37 Even though they were banned, Muslim leaders engaged
in religious dialog with an attitude of openness that prioritized
humanity. This prohibition of permitting public burials for
Muslims did not take too long, but at that time after the second
Bali bombing, there were Muslims who volunteered to donate
their land for Muslim burial.
However, five years after the second Bali bombing, this
atmosphere of discrimination had disappeared. Even Lene Pedersen
(2014)38 in her research she was surprised to see women wearing
the hijab in Bali. The “anti-Islam” fanaticism that has been
echoed since the bloody incident occurred, Muslim minorities
in Bali have returned to mingle with the Hindus, even though
in fact the sense of trauma and sentiment is still there. Since
then, Muslims have returned to build good relationships with
Hindus through brotherhood and kinship relations as explained
in the next sub-discussion.
Rebuilding Tolerance Shattered: The Principle of Religious
Moderation of Two Religions (Islam-Hindu)
In Bhagavadgita Adhyaya V Sloka 18, it is stated that Hindu
teachings assess religious moderation as:39 “A wise human will
consider all other people the same, whether he is a brahmana
who is kind-hearted or a despicable person without kasta”.
While in Islam it is known as al-Ta‘âruf which means
knowing each other with all humans on earth, as enshrined in
al-Qur’ân (Surah al-Hujarât: 13).40 Before the word ta‘âruf was
preceded by a sentences “innâ khalaqnâkum min dhakar wa
unthâ wa ja‘alnâkum shu‘ûba wa qabâ’ila”, this means that God
created human beings in pairs of male and female types so that
from the result of the marriage, gave birth to people in groups,
different nationalities, and tribes as a result of ta‘âruf in the
form of inter-ethnic relations and relations ethnicity, between
religions, between different and diverse groups of people.
The two principles in Hindusm and Islam show how the
two religions are very pro towards religious moderation. Tat
Tvam Asi is me or us; Atmavat Sarva Bhutani which means
humans must treat and position others as they treat themselves41.In
al-Qur’ân Allah describes that whoever kills people not because
of killing other people or doing damage on earth (such as
committing acts of terrorism), it is as if he has killed all humans
in the elements of life in the world; and whoever maintains
human life, it is as if he has taken care of the lives of all
humans (Surah al-Mâ’idah/5: 32).42
These two religions highly uphold the values of religious
moderation and strongly condemn acts of destroying the earth
(terrorism). The consequence of Surah al-Hujarât/49: 13 and Surah
al-Mâ’idah/5: 32 makes the Hindu Puri Pemecutan community in
Denpasar welcome the Muslim community from the Bugis islands.
There is an interesting thing that King Pemecutan XI was
often invited to religious events in Serangan such as the “Maulid
Nabi” (Prophet’s birthday), weddings, Islamic holidays such as
the month of Muharrom, the month of Suro, welcoming the
holy month of Ramadan, and others. The King who was “low-
profile” sometimes didn’t hesitate to hug the Bugis Muslims
and greet each other; this was what amazed the Bugis Muslims
and had great respect for the King Pemecutan XI.43
Besides that, the King also allowed Muslims to carry out
Salah and gave a plot of land to Muslims as a place to live and
a location for a mosque. When Muslims were invited to state
events, the King also provides halal food to Muslims.44 On the
anniversary of the two religions, religious moderation is shown
by cooperation with one another, for example during Islamic
Holidays (PHBI) such as Eid al-Fitr, Eid al-Adha, the Prophet’s
birthday (Maulid Nabi), Isra’ Mi’raj, and breaking the fast together
during the month of Ramadhan, Muslim invited King Pemecutan
XI to attend these events. Furthermore, on Hindu Holidays
(PHBH), such as Galungan, Kuningan, and others, Muslims
helped Hindus and attended the event as a food carrier who
carried the food on his head or carried on a parade, as well as
helped other needs in events.45
The King’s high tolerance for Bugis Muslims attracted
Hindus and Muslims to continue maintain good relations in
Denpasar, Bali. This good relationship is maintained and preserved
until now, even Muslims in Bali are known as nyama Slams
(Balinese brothers and sisters) vven though the Bali Bombing
tragedies left deep wounds for Balinese Hindus and also subjected
Muslims in Bali to the pressure of discrimination.
Muslim-Hindus Relations
After the Bali Bombing (after 2002 and 2005) communal
violence has relatively disappeared in Bali, even though there
are seeds of ethnic conflict as explained by Tambiah in 1997
where ethnic conflicts emerged on minority issues in Bali.46
What Hindus felt was the declining economic impact, especially
the tourism sector and small and medium enterprises (UMKM)
as a result of the bombings and felt pressured by the arrival of
Muslim immigrants as workers, tourists, and immigrant status.
This phenomenon increases when the escalation of Muslim
immigrants take parts in economic spaces when stereotypes of
terrorism are pinned to Islam.47
The highlight of this research is that Bali, especially Denpasar
as the capital of Bali Province, can withstand the pressure of the
majority of the Hindus as an endemic victim of terrorism by
the accused Muslim subjects, and to rebuild tolerance and moderation
in unity through the relations built by these two religions after
the bombing.
Minority yet Dominates: Muslim-Hindu Relations in an Economic
Context
The first established relationship is from an economic
perspective. As stated by Barth (1998), previously Muslims came
to Bali to work as laborers who were described as “slaves”, but
over time minority Muslims occupied many economic sectors
independently in Bali so that their status changed to “owners”
rather than labor.48 This means that there is social dependence
of the Hindus on Muslims in the economic chain.
Ni Made Sukerti said 70% of the vendors range from
micro-businesses in local markets in Denpasar to home businesses
are owned and managed by Muslims. Apart from trading in
various products, Muslim minorities also control livestock production
businesses such as chickens and cattle.49 In some of the Hindus
informants we encountered, Muslims were more agile and skilled
than the most local Balinese in terms of the business mentioned
above. In fact, in some cases, Hindus study the production
methods of these businesses by observing Muslim migrants.50
Indirectly there is an symbiotic-mutualism effort between Hindus-
Muslims.
There are several economic spaces that Hindus do not
enter, in contrast, it seems that they support Muslim businesses
openly. Muslims in Bali play a key role in the economy of
Hindu religious rituals even though Muslims in this context
are a minority, such as the Muslims-madeHindu’s ritual trinkets.
Even in our observation, some Hindus spend most of their
income on buying Muslim products.
The Indestructible Relationship: Muslim-Hindus Relations in the
Context of Kinship and Marriage Relationships
The second relationship is kinship and marriage. What is
interesting in this study is that the Bali Bombing incident did
not break the cycle of good relations between Muslim-Hindus
in Bali, which several previous studies did not reveal why good
relations were still maintained between these two groups despite
the strong ethnic and religious contact.
A total of 10 random informants interviewed (4 from Muslim,
6 from Hindus), 7 of them said that they had kinship ties, both
from the Muslim side have relatives with Hindus and vice
versa. The informants admitted that they had family ties between
the two ethnic religions.51
There are 3 types of kinship relations: (1) kinship through
children and grandchildren; it means that their grandfather
and their parents came from one religion (either from Islam or
Hindusm) and then among them chose one of the two religions
which was different from the religion of their grandfather and
parents. (2) the kinship of interfaith intermarriage; these cases
occur frequently so that they become a unique phenomenon
that does not occur in other regions in Indonesia; Marriage
relations can occur from the factor of meeting when establishing
cooperation in the trade sector or when the relationship becomes
an institutional partner, although there is a prohibition in
Islam to marry a man who is not Muslim. (3) the kinship of an
illegal marriage; In some cases in Bali, kinship is formed because
of marriage outside of legal marriage. What is interesting in
the findings of this study is that there is a traditional culture in
Bali “dikumpuli sak durunge married”, which many cases are
marriages between the 2 religions. In this case, although this
relationship is not legitimized, for Balinese culture, this relationship
is still recognized.
This interfaith marriage has been going on for a long
time in Bali since before the Dutch colonial era in Indonesia.
More precisely, the marriage happens between the Muslim Sasak
people and the Balinese Hindu. The case that has occurred is
the marriage of royal blood between the King of Bali Anak
Agung Gde Ngurah Karangasem and a royal-blooded Muslimah
named Denda Aminah.52 The marriage combined elements of
mixing two ethnicities and two different religions for royal
politics to be closer.
What is interesting is that this marriage brings such a
strong relationship between Muslims in Lombok and Hindus
in Bali. This mixture of two ethnicities and two religions tolerates
each other and maintains their beliefs (does not influence each
other). The King paid respect to his wife and Muslim people by
building a Mushalla and a hall for meetings with tokoh adat
and ‘ûlamâ’ in the kingdom. The result of this marriage is the
grandson of the King of Bali and Ratu Denda Aminah who
chose Islam as his religion and attended the al-Qur’ân training
at the palace.53
This kind of relationship shows that interfaith marriage is
a strong foundation for maintaining religious moderation in
intimidation of divisions through radicalism and terrorism.
Although it is customary for the marriage model mentioned
above, the wife must follow the religion of her husband, but
once again we have found that it is not uncommon for men
who embrace Hindusm to marry Muslimah, and vice versa.
This phenomenon shows that the Muslim-Hindus relations
have been established for a long time with a strong structure
and pattern for diversity.
Conclusion
Bali, which is known as “Tourism Heaven”, must be tainted
by the bloody incidents of the Bali Bombing (in 2002 and
2005), and turned into “Tourist Hell”. It is not only the psychological,
socio-economic and multinational effects that are felt around
the world, but also seriously affects the relationship between
two religions (Islam and Hindusm). Terrorism carried out by a
group of irresponsible people in the name of religion (Islam) as
a trigger to legitimize the truth that Bali must be destroyed,
which of course this radical opinion has polluted Islam and its
adherents. Muslims must experience some pressures, discrimination,
and social intimidation from the majority. Hindus believe that
calm and peace are the keys of Hindusm. After the incident,
the relationship between the two religions experienced disintegration,
even though historically, they had maintained good relations
for hundreds of years. After the Bali Bombing for approximately
two decades, Denpasar Bali as the capital of the Province has
improved and built a badly polluted area in the world in various
ways, one of which is to rebuild religious tolerance between
adherents of the two religions that collapsed due to the explosion
of terrorism.
This article describes the opposite, where after the incident,
the adherents of these two religions worked hand in hand to
build religious moderation with Muslim-Hindus relations in
an economic context as indicated by the persistence of Muslim
minorities in Denpasar on controlling the economic system,
and the majority of Hindus as supporters of Muslim efforts to
keep economy activitiesrunning in Denpasar. Meanwhile, the
second established relationship is from kinship and marital
relations which are the main factors in the strengthening of the
relationship between the two religions in Bali. The argument
obtained in this research is that the resilience of Muslims as a
minority is very strong even though the terrible onslaught of
terrorism became the most violent crime in the world, but
because of the principles of the two religions that are pro to
religious moderation and the long-established relationship has
made Muslim-Hindus relations in Bali survive until now.
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